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T
he division of Germany after
World War II and the
reunification of East and
West Germany in 1990 can
be thought of as a ‘natural
experiment’ in which it is possible to assess
the importance of market access for
economic development. With the
foundation of East and West Germany as
separate states in 1949, West German cities
close to the border went from being at the
heart of an integrated Germany to being on
the edge of the Western world. As a result,
these cities experienced a disproportionate
loss of market access, losing numerous
nearby trading partners with whom they
could previously interact at low cost.
Our research finds that following
division, West German cities close to the
new border experienced a marked decline
in population growth relative to other
West German cities. We estimate that over
the 40-year period of division, there was a
decline in their annual rate of population
growth of 0.75 percentage points, which
implies a cumulative reduction of about
one third in the size of border cities
relative to non-border cities.
The difference in population growth
rates for the two groups of cities was not
apparent prior to division but emerged
immediately afterwards. And the effect
was strongest in the 1950s and 1960s,
declining over time. This is consistent with
gradual adjustment to a new long-run
distribution of population. We also find
evidence to confirm that our results are
capturing loss of market access rather
than other potential explanations, such as
systematic differences in city structure,
destruction during World War II or the fear
of further armed conflict.
Germany’s post-war division
Following World War II, Germany's
boundaries changed dramatically. Map 1
illustrates how the pre-war country was
divided into four different parts: West and
East Germany and two areas that became
parts of Poland and Russia. West
Germany made up roughly 53% of the
pre-war area and just over 58% of the
pre-war population of 69.3 million. East
Germany comprised 23% of the area and
22% of the population. And the areas
that became parts of Poland and Russia
contained 24% of the area and 14% of
the population. The remaining 6% of the
population was in East and West Berlin.
The political process leading to the
division of Germany took several
unexpected turns. While various proposals
to divide the country after its eventual
defeat were discussed during the early
phase of World War II, the United States
and Russia backed off such plans towards
the end of the war. Instead, the main
planning effort was to organise the
military occupation of Germany. Early on,
it was decided that separate zones of
occupation would be allocated to the
American, British and Russian armies. The
planning process for the zones began in
spring 1943, negotiations continued
during 1944 and the protocol formalising
the zones was signed in London in
September 1944.
The protocol divided Germany into
zones of roughly equal population after
excluding the areas expected to become
parts of Poland and Russia. In line with
the location of the advancing armies, the
northern part of what would later
become West Germany was to be
occupied by British forces, the southern
part was to be controlled by American
forces, and the remaining eastern parts of
the country were to be occupied by the
Russian army. In addition, it was agreed
that American, British and Russian forces
would jointly occupy Berlin. The protocol
was modified in 1945 to create a small
French zone in the south-western corner
of Germany, which was achieved by
reducing the size of the American and
British zones.
Location,
location, location
How important is access to markets as a driver
of economic prosperity? In new research,
Stephen Redding and Daniel Sturm address
this question by analysing the post-war division
of Germany and its impact on the border cities
in the West suddenly cut off from their nearby
trading partners.
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As tensions between the Western
allies and Russia increased with the onset
of the cold war, the zones of occupation
became the basis for the foundation of
separate East and West German states in
1949. The territory of West Germany was
the combined area of the American,
British and French zones, and was
extended to include the Saarland from
1957. East Germany was founded on the
Russian zone.
While the two new countries
maintained some politically motivated and
largely symbolic economic co-operation,
any local economic links between areas on
either side of the border were entirely
suppressed from 1949, when East
Germany introduced central planning.
From 1952, there were extensive border
fortifications and the new border between
East and West Germany became one of
the most sealed and best guarded in the
world. Limited transit between East and
West Berlin remained possible until 1961,
when the Berlin Wall was built.
The division of Germany was
formalised in international treaties and
was generally believed to be permanent.
But growing dissatisfaction among East
Germans about heavy restrictions on
mobility, lack of personal freedom and the
declining performance of the economy led
to large-scale demonstrations in 
1989, culminating in the fall of the 
Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. East
Germany rapidly disintegrated and only
eleven months later, East and West
Germany were formally reunified on 
3 October 1990.
New economic geography
Our research examines the implications of
German divison and reunification using
the analytical techniques of the ‘new
economic geography’ (Fujita et al, 1999;
Helpman, 1998). In these models, the
location of economic activity and the
distribution of population across cities are
determined by the balance between
‘agglomeration’ and ‘dispersion’ – those
forces that attract firms and workers to
large markets and those that repel them
from those markets.
Agglomeration forces arise from
increasing returns to scale, transport costs
and consumer preferences for variety.
Firms like to concentrate production
because of economies of scale, and they
like to concentrate production close to
large markets because of transport costs.
Workers like to consume a variety of
goods and, combined with transport costs,
this means that they like to be near to
where many firms produce.
Map 1:
Germany before World War II
Notes: The map shows Germany in its pre-WWII borders
(usually referred to as the 1937 borders) and the division of
Germany into an area that became part of Russia, an area that
became part of Poland, East Germany and West Germany.
The West German cities in our sample that are within 
75 kilometres of the German-German border are denoted by
squares, all other cities by circles.
Following Germany’s
division, West German
cities close to the 
border experienced a
marked relative decline
in population
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Dispersion forces arise from the limited
supply of immobile resources like land and
housing. As the size of a city grows, the
prices of immobile resources increase,
raising workers' cost of living. Workers are
assumed to be geographically mobile and
will relocate until the real wage is
equalised across cities.
We use the model to simulate the
division of Germany. The key prediction
that emerges from the simulation is that
West German cities close to the border
should decline relative to other cities
because they are disproportionately
affected by the loss of access to markets
and sources of supply on the other side of
the border. Among the border cities, the
decline in relative size is predicted to be
greater for smaller cities, where their own
markets are smaller and where access to
economic activity elsewhere is
correspondingly more important.
Changing populations 
of West German cities,
1919-2002
To examine whether the predictions of the
economic geography model are
confirmed, we examine data for the
period 1919-2002 and measure the
population changes in 119 West German
cities that had more than 20,000
inhabitants in 1919. Pre-war populations
are only available for the census years of
1919, 1925, 1933 and 1939. For the post-
war period, we have data at 10-year
intervals between 1950 and 1980 plus
1988 and 1992 (immediately before and
after reunification) and 2002. Table 1 lists
the 20 cities in our data that we classify as
border cities, those located within 
75 kilometres of the border. Our basic
empirical strategy is to compare the
population growth of these cities 
with the population growth of the
remaining cities both before and after
Germany was divided.
Figure 1 shows the changing city
populations over time of the two groups
as a whole. (For each group, population is
expressed as an index relative to its 1919
value, and the two vertical lines indicate
the year 1949 when the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany) and the
German Democratic Republic (East
Germany) were established and the year
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Figure 1:
Indices of border and non-border city populations
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Difference in population indices, border/non-border
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Bamberg Hannover
Bayreuth Hildesheim
Braunschweig Hof
Celle Kassel
Coburg Kiel
Erlangen Lübeck
Fulda Lüneberg 
Göttingen Neumünster
Goslar Schweinfurt
Hamburg Würzberg 
Table 1:
The 20 West German 
‘border cities’
Those lying within 75 kilometres of the former 
border between East and West Germany
Population in border
cities actually fell
between 1960 and 
1980, while population in
non-border cities
continued to grow
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estimates provide a lower bound to the
negative effect of division on border cities.
Following reunification in 1990, 
there was a step-increase in city
populations in West Germany, reflecting
migration from the former East Germany.
This migration raised population in non-
border cities by somewhat more than in
border cities. From 1992, population in
the border cities grew somewhat faster
than in non-border cities, which is
consistent with the beginning of a
recovery arising from improved market
access after reunification.
Is market access the
explanation?
The observed decline of the border cities is
consistent with market access being an
important determinant of regional
prosperity as predicted by the economic
geography model. Furthermore, the results
are hard to explain in terms of institutions
or natural endowments, which are the
1990 when the two countries were
reunited.) Figure 2 represents the
difference between the two population
indices, indicating the impact of division
on the population of border cities relative
to non-border cities.
Before World War II, the population
growth of border and non-border cities
was very similar, with the former growing
slightly slower during the Great Depression
of the early 1930s but recovering their
trend growth rate by 1939. During World
War II and its immediate aftermath, border
cities experienced marginally higher
population growth than non-border cities,
probably due to migration from East
Germany and the areas of pre-war
Germany that became part of Poland 
and Russia.
This pattern changed sharply after
1949, when East and West Germany
emerged as separate states with different
economic systems and local economic
links were severed. From this point, West
German cities close to the new border
experienced substantially lower rates of
population growth than non-border cities.
Population in the border cities actually fell
between 1960 and 1980, whereas
population in non-border cities continued
to grow.
By the early 1980s, the discrepancy in
rates of population growth was beginning
to close, which is consistent with the idea
that the negative effect of division on
border cities had gradually worked itself
out and the distribution of population in
West Germany was approaching a new
‘steady state’. But the slower decline of
the border cities during the 1970s and
1980s may also be explained in part by
the extensive regional policy programmes
aimed at supporting the areas close to the
border with East Germany, which grew
substantially during this period. To the
extent that these subsidy programmes
were successful in promoting the
development of the border regions, our
Over the 40 years of division, there was a
cumulative reduction of one third in the size
of border cities relative to non-border cities 
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two main competing explanations for
variations in economic prosperity. Our
sample of West German cities shared the
same institutions and also had very similar
natural endowments over time.
Nonetheless, there are other possible
explanations for the results:
 First, cities close to the new border could
have specialised in industries that
experienced a secular decline in the
post-war period.
 Second, the border cities could have
suffered a disproportionate amount of
war-related damage, which may have
hindered their post-war development.
 Finally, people may have moved away
from the border out of a belief that
these cities would be particularly
vulnerable in case of a new armed
conflict in Western Europe.
We provide a number of additional
pieces of evidence to show that the
decline of the border cities is explained by
their loss of market access and not by
these alternative explanations:
 First, we use a measure of market
potential – a widely used proxy for
market access – to estimate the loss of
market access due to the new border for
each city in our dataset. The drop in
market potential caused by the new
border provides a complete explanation
of the differential growth of the border
cities.
 Second, as suggested by the new
economic geography model, the decline
of the border cities was not uniform.
Smaller cities were disproportionately
affected by the loss of hinterland.
 Third, those parts of the population that
were no longer economically active
reacted less to the imposition of the
border than the economically active
population.
 Finally, we establish that neither the
degree of war-related destruction nor
patterns of specialisation can explain the
relative decline of the border cities.
Our research findings do not imply
that institutions and natural endowments
are irrelevant in determining economic
development: the experience of East
Germany during the period of division is
itself an interesting case study
demonstrating the relevance of
institutions. The contribution of our work
is to provide clear evidence for the
importance of market access as a driver 
of economic prosperity.
Smaller cities were
disproportionately
affected by being cut off
from their nearby trading
partners in East Germany
This article summarises ‘The Costs of
Remoteness: Evidence from German Division
and Reunification’ by Stephen Redding and
Daniel Sturm, CEP Discussion Paper No. 688
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0688.pdf).
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Germany’s experiences
provide clear evidence
for the importance of
market access as a driver
of economic prosperity
